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REMARKS

The Legal Profession: A Critical
Evaluation*
Arlin M. Adams**
I.

Introduction

All professions, especially one as central to American life as the
legal profession, should undergo a continuing process of examination
and self-evaluation. Any group that does not engage in such an exercise loses much that makes it a profession: a shared set of principles
and customs that transcend self-interest and speak to the essential
nature of the particular calling or trade.
There are greater reasons beyond periodic examination, however, that make this topic most compelling. In recent years, the legal
profession has undergone fundamental changes that threaten to sever
it from its traditional moorings. A qualitative revolution has occurred within the legal community to the extent that the practice
which existed forty years ago is hardly recognizable today.
No calling has occupied a more important and undeviating role
in the emergence and development of American society. The practice
of law, almost by definition, should establish and promote the common good and bring forth the advancement and betterment of society. As a profession, however, we have departed from the practice as
it has been envisioned from the early days of the Republic. This dra* These remarks were delivered as the Tresolini Lecture at Lehigh University, in
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, on November 10, 1988.
** B.S. 1941, M.A. 1951, D.H.L. 1965, Temple University; LL.B. 1947, University of
Pennsylvania Law School; Retired Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; Of Counsel, Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Pa.; Past President of the
American Judicature Society; Lecturer in Constitutional Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School.
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matic change has strong overtones for the future. Although many
authors have chronicled the recent transition of the legal profession,
few are willing to argue that these developments have evolved for the
betterment of society.
The sources causing the changes in the legal profession are both
external and internal. The external pressures arise from great movements in the body of substantive law and in the types of services that
lawyers are now required to perform. The changes in what constitutes the practice of law, in turn, have transformed who constitutes
the practitioners of law. From an internal standpoint, the profession
has undergone as drastic a transformation as the substantive law
that governs us. I shall attempt to address these two antecedents of
professional metamorphosis in sequence.
II.

Changes in the Law

Just a few decades ago the rules governing society were almost
entirely of the common law variety. Under the common law system,
the recognized doctrines of law originated from historic precedent
and were gradually forged by lawyers and judges as society advanced and matured. In recent years, however, the proliferation of
statutory and regulatory law has relegated the common law to a far
less prominent position.
The common law system was designed to adjudicate disputes
between two relatively equal parties according to well-established
principles. The former common law practitioner drew on diverse and
traditional doctrines regarding the relationship between government
and property, whereas the modern day practice consists primarily of
various statutory, regulatory, and administrative specialties. A large
share of litigation today entails large and complicated breach of contract suits, complex real estate transactions, intricate corporate matters, and financial maneuvering in the international capital markets.
The substance and function of the types of matters the law addresses
has shifted from the small scale of the common law to the large
scope of a practice dominated by extensive financial concerns.
The second source of change in the law is the burgeoning areas
of practice relating to government. The rise of the administration
state - the so-called headless fourth branch of government - has
been sweeping. The establishment of quasi-judicial authorities and
agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Environmental Protection Agency, has accelerated continuously since World

THE LEGAL PROFESSION

War II, and shows little sign of abating. The number of federal
agencies alone has increased from twenty to well over seventy, many
with narrow, sometimes overlapping purposes.
Furthermore, in the coming months additional federal bodies
governing the closing of industrial facilities and merger-and-acquisition transactions undoubtedly will be established. The proliferation
of federal administrative agencies has been matched by a parallel
expansion of state and local bodies. As expected, a government of
greater size and scope has necessarily increased the share of legal
work devoted to relatively novel, specialized administrative areas.
A third and perhaps the most significant development in the law
in the past few decades is the emergence of several new forms of
legal actions. The number of class action suits and other types of
multiparty litigation has grown substantially in the past several
years. This phenomenon has led to the introduction of "public" issues into the private litigation setting. Public issues are generally defined as those involving societal concerns and numerous parties, and
are thus arguably more appropriate for legislative consideration. In
contrast, private controversies are those amenable to judicial resolution between two discrete parties.
The distinction between public and private issues serves as a
point of comparison between the past and the present era. Matters
that once were clearly within the realm of public affairs now routinely appear before courts. There has been a clear departure in the
perceived role of the judiciary. Litigation encompassing environmental and public health issues, products liability, industrial and nuclear
safety, civil rights, and other litigation involving nontraditional
plaintiffs is a relatively new development, which reflects this
departure.
Much of the expansion in public interest litigation can be attributed to the characteristics of our latter-day economy. Mass producers of consumer goods, environmental polluters, and other large industrial aggregations now possess the ability to affect or injure large
classes of citizens. Whether the radical innovations in the conduct of
judicial affairs are a reflection of a change in the prevailing notions
of the law or of greater economic forces, however, is not the issue at
hand. The question whether law is a product of economic determinism or whether law shapes the path of economic change is a subject
worthy of its own discrete forum.
In either event, however, the effect of these innovations of the
profession is undeniable. The characteristic of gradualism - the be-
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lief that law originated from natural truths and was fashioned,
through time, to accommodate newly developing human relationships - was the foundation of our common law history. Around this
basic orientation, ethical norms and mores developed that fostered
the evolution of the common law. Taken as a whole these practices
emerged into a philosophy of legal professionalism. This concept of
gradual change through reasoned treatment, however, is subjugated,
or at least strained, in a legal climate of rapid and drastic
transformation.
A.

Changes in Lawyering

The decline in professionalism as its relates to the law has occurred, at least in part, because of a diminution in the defining element of gradualism. Change in the law necessarily causes change in
the profession. The great emphasis in today's practice on large transactional matters at the expense of individual client service particularly tends to undermine the values that define professionalism. The
results of this transformation are readily apparent in how the typical
law practice has changed.
A few years ago, single practitioners and small groups of lawyers dominated the practice. A firm with twenty attorneys was considered large. Today, firms with over two hundred lawyers are not
unusual, and a partnership of twenty is generally limited to handling
only small matters. In 1975, there were only four firms with over 200
lawyers in the United States, and they were viewed with great skepticism. In contrast, a recent survey reported well over 150 firms with
more than 200 attorneys and there is far less reservation about the
wisdom of the large firm as a legal institution. Indeed, last year, one
of these firms celebrated the hiring of its 1,000th lawyer.
The advent of megafirms has substantially altered law practice.
It is not unusual now to have firms with offices throughout the nation
and even in major cities abroad. Moreover, a firm in Philadelphia
attempting to hire students from Harvard, Yale, or Stanford will
likely have to bid against firms from New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Denver that are seeking to do the same. Thus, the marketplace for legal services and the marketplace for attorneys has grown
national, sometimes international, in scope.
The small-town practitioner with intimate ties only to his local
community is becoming a vanishing figure. Industry analysts predict
that the growth in firm size will continue and will lead to a shakeout
where the giant conglomerates will be the principal survivors. In-
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deed, proposals have been made in many state bars that would allow
non-lawyers to own and control law firms so that they may operate
more like business corporations. If this trend continues, there may be
no place left for the individual practitioner or the small group of
practitioners.
The expansion in the large, institutionalized practice has been
made possible, I believe, by three developments in the way lawyers
are trained and work. Taken as a whole, these elements - the new
labor economies of the practice - constitute the changing internal
climate of the profession.
The first development is the proliferation of law schools and
lawyers. The number of lawyers in the United States has doubled
since 1970 and is now well over 700,000, far and away the most
lawyers for any nation in the world. The students fueling this expanding army are being trained at a growing number of law schools
and in larger entering classes. The elite schools such as Harvard,
Yale, and Pennsylvania have attempted to maintain the same number of students. Other law schools, however, especially state university law schools, have greatly expanded their enrollments.
A second factor allowing the progression of larger and larger
firms is the fees for services that these firms now charge. This development is especially pertinent to the transactional nature of the
practice. Forty years ago, the cost and time spent on legal services
was a negligible part of business decisions. Today, the consideration
of legal fees is a major factor in many of these transactions.
The rise of large legal fees has had other significant effects.
Many have read about the $75,000 starting salaries and $10,000 bonuses given to graduating students, but even these numbers do not
reflect the magnitude of the factor of money in large firm practice.
The American Lawyer, a publication devoted to glamorizing big
firms, now publishes annual financial data on such firms. Recent
figures show firms realizing over $1,000,000 per year in revenues per
lawyer; $1,000,000 in profit per partner; and one New York firm
approaching $300,000,000 in total revenues.' Under headlines that
blare: "Generating Revenue: The Key to The Bottom Line,"' the
editors assure that faltering local economies will not affect business,3
and warn that excessive pro bono work may lower a firm's
I. THE AMERICAN
2. Id. at 34.
3. Id. at 58.

LAWYER,

July/August, 1988, The Am Law 100 Report.
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profitability.'
Concentration on profit-maximization provides less and less
time for lawyers to spend on public and professional activities. Obligations to the community and to the profession are subordinated
when constant attention must be given to monetary aspects. Consequently, these vital elements undergirding the ideal of the principled,
public-minded practitioner of old are victims of the recent preoccupation with fees, firm profits, and inordinate salaries.
The third element permitting the growth of large institutional
firms is the level of specialization now required in the legal profession. At one time a lawyer may have dealt with a number of different types of matters in any particular period. Today's young attorneys, however, are required to specialize almost immediately.
Sizeable firms generally are organized into departments practicing
one type of law. Differentiation of the legal labor force is essential to
sustain these large organizations. The necessity to develop "instant
expertise" is particularly troublesome, I believe, as it is inconsistent
with the traditional vision of legal practice as a diverse and liberal
endeavor. Excessive specialization inevitably detracts from the rich
and full legacy of the profession.
B.

The Strained Judicial Process

With a clearer understanding of what the changing legal environment encompasses, we can now focus on its implications for the
historic mission of the practitioner in our society. It is appropriate to
ask what effect the confluence of these pressures has had on the judicial system that attempts to adjust to them. The structure of our
system of courts and judges was shaped, essentially, for the common
law practice of yesteryear. Consequently, just like any other infrastructure designed to accommodate traffic, be it an interstate highway or a shopping mall, the addition of greater and greater amounts
of traffic creates a strain and hinders the ability of the system to
function efficiently.
The exponential growth in litigation in recent years has imposed
such a tension on our legal infrastructure. The number of lawsuits
filed in both state and federal courts is unprecedented. Heavier
caseloads and the growing percentage of complex multiparty actions
create a burden that courts are not institutionally equipped to handle. As a result, the level of procedural excess and abuse of pretrial
4.

Id. at 20.
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procedures has risen as well. That our judicial system, which is
charged in large part with the development of substantive law and
the efficient administration of justice, must now endure a constant
state of procedural impasse is without precedent and is a poor reflection on the state of the profession. A pivotal role of an advocate in
our adversarial system is the public duty to advance the edification
of the courts and to assist in their efficient administration. Abuse of
the discovery process and dilatory tactics abridge this duty and diminish yet another public aspect of the profession.
The political response to the judicial crisis caused by the changing legal atmosphere has been primarily to add more judges to an
already overburdened system. Thus, in 1945 there were 100 federal
judges; today there are over 700. To a lesser extent, the response has
been to hire court administrators and to install high-tech equipment.
The emergence of court administrators, whose jobs are primarily to
facilitate the operation of the courts, is illustrative of the continuing
need simply to keep traffic moving. The question then arises as to
what effect a constant preoccupation with the quantity of judicial
output has on the qualitative aspects of that product.
The destruction and replacement of historic doctrines of the
law, I believe, is at least a partial result. The introduction of public
issues into a judicial setting and increased use of class action methodologies are directly attributable and symptomatic of justice dispensed in wholesale fashion. In a larger sense, the role of judges in
this type of environment has changed. The gradualism and intellectual spirit of the common law, where the judge performed the passive roles of preserving legal doctrine and pursuing thoughtful objectivity, are often lost in today's courtrooms.
In recent years, there has been a robust debate within the legal
community whether judges should follow a path of judicial activism
or restraint. In may ways, this debate embraces a non-issue. The
distinction between active and passive interpretation is, I believe,
tenuous and better given to philosophical consideration. It is significant, however, that such a debate even exists. Whether a judge
should engage in aggressive intervention in disputes departs from the
ideal of the neutral and objective arbitrator. Nonetheless, many
judges are now known for their predisposition to engage in activism
by creating new causes of action rather than the traditional qualities
of consistent thoughtful deliberation. This new emphasis in the judicial process is a direct function of what is perceived as the changing
legal profession.
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Disappearance of the Individual Legal Personality

A second, more noteworthy consequence of the shift in the profession is the disappearance of what may be characterized as the
individual legal personality. Just as increased traffic flow means that
one is unlikely to be acquainted with the person driving the automobile next to yours, the increased traffic within the profession creates
its own type of anonymity. Legal relationships, whether lawyer-client
or among lawyers, have become far less personal in the past few decades. Practice in a large law firm has a tendency to mechanize the
relationship between counsel.
At one time, admission into the bar meant passage into a sort of
egalitarian fraternity. The large firm of today, however, imposes
both explicit and implicit hierarchical arrangements among its attorneys. Under these circumstances, professional alienation can flourish.
A lawyer who is required, even before graduation, to focus on a specialty can easily view himself more as a technician and less as a
servant of the profession itself and its role in the larger community.
Since practice in a sizeable firm necessarily involves large, institutionalized clients, the real sense of inclusion and obligation to the
broader community is often lost.
The idea that a lawyer's day-to-day experience can be so divorced from actual contact or knowledge of his or her clients was
virtually unknown just a few short years ago. Yet an attorney working for a substantial institutional client can have very little, if any,
relationship with his client on a personal basis. Deprived of this type
of gratifying professional satisfaction, more and more attorneys must
find an external reason, whether individual enjoyment or money, to
gain a sense of purpose.
Although there are numerous and diverse opportunities for an
attorney to obtain satisfaction through public interest or pro bono
work, those relationships too have taken on a distinct institutional
flavor. Large organized programs are now required to provide pro
bono services. It is most unfortunate that a graduating law student,
because of the demands of time and money, has so little opportunity
to secure a personal sense of reward by using his or her skills to
assist an indigent individual.
Perhaps even more significant than the mechanism of lawyerclient relations is the loss of personal community among lawyers
themselves. It is not unusual, in fact quite likely, that lawyers in a
typical firm are practically strangers. That fact alone is not startling
because any large organization, be it a university, a hospital, or a
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bank, must be operated on an impersonal, organizational level. The
case of the large, urban law firm is particularly disturbing, however,
because of what must be subordinated to organizational structure.
The collegiality and democratic spirit that once governed relations within a firm have been replaced by bureaucratic forms of control and frequently a somewhat oppressive "up-or-out" mentality.
The sense of individual legal personality is sacrificed to the concept
of firm identity. Moreover, the sense of professionalism and professional identity among lawyers is often replaced by the commercial
exigencies of large firm competition.
Lawyers have historically provided a wellspring of governmental
and political leadership to the nation. The common law was an incomparable incubator for developing the qualities and dedication
that we ascribe to sound, progressive, and energetic civil leadership.
Scholarship, broad vision, and equanimity - elements that marked
a successful common law practitioner - also defined the hallmarks
of a dedicated public servant.
The disappearance of the individual legal personality threatens
to disrupt the profession's important role in preparing public servants. I question whether apprenticeship in a large firm today can be
a measure of the training that the common law practice provided.
Can the specialized, institutional experience of a large firm become
the equivalent of development through individual common law practice in the selection of our next generation of governors, judges, mayors, and other officials? These questions should be quite high in the
pantheon of considerations for the continuing mission of our profession as large legal entities capture the most promising legal talent
available.
Regrettably, the answers to these questions appear to be in the
negative. The large firms of today are simply not producing this type
of leadership. Last year, of the nearly 11,000 students graduating
from the top law schools, only 243 chose to begin their careers in
some type of public interest work.5 Plucked directly from school and
dropped into well-paying positions that demand enormous commitments of time and energy, it is not surprising that these young attorneys might view public service as secondary and unrewarding.
The law firms themselves, however, must also share responsibility for not contributing to the leadership of their communities. As a
young attorney, I was encouraged to enter public life by the senior
5. Kaplan, Out of 11,000, 243 Went into Public Interest, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 8, 1988, at 1,
col. I.
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partner of my firm as an opportunity to serve the public. Today, the
structural and financial necessities of maintaining a large firm create
pressures that, in turn, deter young lawyers from entering public service. Within the business mindset of large firms, it simply is not
profitable to lend talent to the community at large.
IV.

Commercialization of Law and Practice

The third, and perhaps most pervasive manifestation of the
change in the legal climate is the decline of professionalism and its
replacement with commercialism. If one general theme could encompass the many changes in our legal environment, it would be the
adoption of the mores and manners of the marketplace at the expense of expressions of professional affiliation. One might legitimately ask: "What is wrong with this?" After all, lawyering is like
any other calling; young people still choose to go into law primarily
for monetary reasons and, more often than not, are rewarded for
that choice. I suppose that one would be hard-pressed to persuade
the general public, whether on a street corner in New York City or
Davenport, Iowa, that what the practice of law is all about is not
money. But the real danger lies when those within the profession are
convinced that what it is all about is material success.
The profession occupies a key role in a democratically organized
society. Americans tend to divide the dimensions of public life into
two general spheres. One half is the business or economic realm. An
economy based on capitalism and the institution of private property
are the source of this culture. Economic freedom, efficiency, and material reward are its basic values. The other half of what constitutes
our public affairs is the political or civil culture. The highest virtues
here are political freedom, equality, and justice. Its institutional
foundations are the free-functioning political process and the unbiased administration of justice.
Each culture or set of values must be allowed to flourish; that is
what, to a considerable extent, constitutes the genius of the American polity. Furthermore, it is important that neither should grow to
dominate the other. A correct balance between the influences of our
civil government and the business marketplace is the perpetual challenge of democracy. Given this challenge, it is the proper role of the
lawyer to stabilize the social equilibrium of the forces and
counterforces of a dynamic society. The law is an affirmation or expression of the structure of our government and our consensual beliefs. Lawyers must operate as its vigilant defender. Just as the true
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entrepreneur may be viewed as the paradigm of the business culture,
each lawyer should represent the epitome of the values and virtues of
the civic culture.
When the legal profession adopts too many of the commercial
aspects of business, the civic values that lawyers should represent are
in danger of being eroded. It is for this reason that mourning the
decline in professionalism is not merely an exercise in sentimentality.
We must not permit the practice of law to become just another
white-collar industry. Nor must we permit lawyers to be viewed as
economic units of production and their work product to be seen as
"widgets." Such a mercantilistic vision would be tantamount to an
admission that our civic heritage is quantifiable and can be exchanged, and that what was once self-evident and inalienable is no
longer so.
Yet, evidence of this development can be found in several respects. The one that is perhaps most representative, and coincidentally the one I personally find quite troubling, although probably
necessary, is the timesheets that lawyers are required to have nearby
throughout the working day. Aside from being a continuous distraction, these instruments are a repeated reminder that everything a
lawyer does can and should be quantified for payment. In large cities, some firms have begun billing based on one-twelfth of an hour.
That means that every action that a lawyer performs, whether opening mail or answering a short telephone call, will be recorded and
billed to the client.
The commercialization of the profession, however, runs far
deeper than timesheets or expense accounts. The decline in professionalism has deprived an entire generation of practitioners of suitable role models. At the risk of sounding nostalgic, I believe that the
profession has lost its grasp of the big picture and of the aspects and
aspirations of the higher calling of this secular ministry.
Lawyers that are perceived as most successful today, or at least
the ones gaining the most remuneration, are those who specialize in
merger and acquisition work. This development is particularly illustrative of the overall commercialization of practice, in that elaborate
takeover schemes in large part involve the reorganization of interests
while adding little value to society. Seldom in these complex, moneychanging arrangements is there room for consideration of the public
interest or societal consequences. The ideal of the lawyer as vindicator of the rights vested in our civic culture is lost. Just as the inventor of the hula hoop or bikini once gained the greatest reward in the
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business culture, the lawyer specializing in junk bonds is the new
example of success in the legal firmament.
Nor is commercialization of the civil culture lost on the general
public. One astute social observer remarked recently that members
of our society are no longer referred to as "citizens" but instead are
simply grouped into the class known as "consumers." When the philosophy of every free person possessing an equal franchise in our
democratic society is lost, and citizens are best recognized for their
position in the macroeconomy, our civic heritage has been seriously
compromised.
Just as we might despair over the loss of the true entrepreneur
in society, the decline of professionalism in legal practice should invite equal consternation. The public perception of the profession is
now gained more through avenues such as The People's Court, L.A.
Law, or television and telephone book ads for attorneys, rather than
from the practice of the profession. What could be more discouraging than a generation of individuals receiving their understanding of
their civic rights and obligations through these vistas?
Equally distressing is the prospect of members of the profession
affirmatively accepting this commercialized vision of themselves.
Law schools, which should be the bulwark of the loftiest ideals of the
profession, are frequently more hospitable to various \hucksters or
personalities of law rather than to the great role models of yesteryear. It is a melancholy commentary that the inventor of a heart
valve frequently will labor in obscurity while the promoter of some
new patent medicine, whether a baldness cure or weight loss miracle,
will gain immediate attention and riches. But the decline in the professionalism of the legal practice and the rise of the poor substitute
of commercial manners, is an equally regrettable indictment of our
society. When the giants of legal history are relegated to the back of
the classroom or the rear of a bar association meeting, it is important to consider who is moving to the front.
V.

Conclusion

We must be on guard to assure that my assessment of the state
of our profession is not merely the product of an affection for days
past. In this regard, I am reminded that in 1905, Louis Brandeis,
later a Supreme Court Justice, remarked that the profession at that
time caused him much concern. He was alarmed at the progressive
encroachment of material influences on the great and beloved principles of the law. A year later, Roscoe Pound, soon to be Dean of
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Harvard Law School, in a seminal address entitled "Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice," criticized the
prevailing legal institutions as not being able to serve a nation on the
verge of realizing its destiny. Pound noted the absence of any encompassing "Philosophy of the Law" that would allow the profession to
guide the nation through the challenges of the new century.
Even if what I have said thus far can be attributed to generational politics, and I concede that the trust of my comments parallels
to some extent those of Brandeis and Pound, there still remains the
constant necessity to re-examine the ideals and premises of the profession. Even if we are not in the last days of the principled practice
of law, the current developments, as I have sought to describe them,
deserve careful attention. The quest for Pound's "Philosophy of the
Law" must continue if our profession is to lead society once again
into the potentials of a new century that soon will be upon us.
Assuming that the state of the practice deserves the scrutiny of
both the legal and non-legal communities, it is customary for the
commentator to point out the obvious but unchosen answer. If there
exists such an answer or path to be pursued, however, it will not be
found in these remarks. The most compelling reason for this is simply that I am not in possession of any such remedy.
If there is an answer to the renewal of the professional ethic in
the legal community, I do not believe it will come from any technical
adjustment in the rules. The dramatic forces at work in the profession, both internally and externally, will not recede through administrative tinkering. That type of technocratic answer does not exist
and, even if we could discover it, it recalls a solution more representative of the business culture. There simply is no quick antidote to
materialism.
Rather, if a reassertion of professional faith is to occur, it must
arise from a reaffirmation of our civic heritage. Members of the profession, the lawyers and the judges, must again possess a sense of
their individual legal personality and faith in the ultimate mission of
their calling. Additional bar programs or law school requirements
may help, but by themselves they will not recapture the passion and
dedication of a lapsed faith. The role of the lawyer has not changed.
The members of the profession must be willing to reassume it, and to
do so with necessary vigor.
On the occasion of the two-hundredth anniversary of our Constitution, I outlined the aspects of what I view as the unchanged role
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of the practitioner.' These basic qualities, I submit, merit reiteration.
The first is service to the community. Lawyers must again recognize
that they have been entrusted with a great privilege, and that obligations to the community go with that privilege. Attorneys have occupied a singular role in service to our society from the framing of our
Constitution to the Civil Rights Movement. Members of the profession must once again accept the responsibility of formulating theories and rules to allow the various elements of the public to expand
the ability of a nation to serve its citizens. Any enduring philosophy
regarding legal practice must be rooted in the belief that lawyers
receive their license and are empowered by the greater society, and
must therefore labor to insure its progress. The idea of the practice
of law as a completely private exercise for private ends is contrary to
this conviction.
A second characteristic is dedication to what Justice Holmes
called the "craftsmanship" of lawyering. There must be a renewed
sense of pride in the work that lawyers do, not merely for its value in
the marketplace, but for its historic function of vindicating the rights
of citizens.
The third characteristic is devotion to the profession itself. The
changing face of the law demands that lawyers reassert their professional ties and responsibilities. Members of the bar have traditionally
recognized the importance of supporting their bar associations and
continuing an active role in legal education. Profit must not become
our dominant ethic. Nor must profit become the primary engine for
professional change. A renewal in the faith of professionalism must
originate from within and reverse our troubling path. Only when
such a new direction is pursued will good sense and professional virtue prevail.
Despite the sobering tone of my remarks, I am not completely
discouraged. Although many of us have halting doubts about recent
developments in the profession, I believe it can still fulfill what is
highest in the yearnings of the human spirit. Our history has been
replete with inspiring figures: John Marshall, Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Benjamin Cardozo, and Learned Hand, to name a few.
Each can serve as a beacon.
As Judge Hand eloquently put it in addressing the conflict that
is normal in a pluralistic society:
For it is always dawn. Day breaks forever, and above the
6.

A. Adams, Remarks at the "We the People 200" Convocation with the Supreme

Court Justices at the Arch Street Friends Society (Oct. 2, 1987).

THE LEGAL PROFESSION

eastern horizon the sun is now about to peep. Full light of day?
No, perhaps not ever. But yet it grows lighter, and the paths
that were frequently so blind will, if one watches sharply
enough, become hourly plainer. We shall learn to walk
straighter. Yes, it is always dawn.'

7. L. HAND, THE SPIRIT
(I. Dillard 3d ed. 1974).
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